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Depositions and Power of Notary to Punish
for Contempt in Ohio
Richard W. Schwartz*
T HE DEPOSITION plays an important role in the modern-day
practice of law. The enormous backlog of cases in the
courts requires preservation of precious testimony. during the
long wait prior to trial. In addition, the deposition is a valuable
tool in evaluating a case, especially during settlement negotia-
tions. Finally, the deposition is a prime means of discovering
vital information.
The notary public presides at the deposition, and is invested
with quasi-judicial powers, including the power to punish for
contempt. This paper will briefly survey both the procedural
aspects of the deposition and the quasi-judicial power of the
notary public.
The Notary and Mechanics of Taking a Deposition
A deposition is a statutorily prescribed method of taking
the testimony of witnesses,' or, as legislatively defined, it is a
"... written declaration under oath, made upon notice to the
adverse party." 2
The notary public is one of the officers empowered by stat-
ute3 to take depositions. Section 147.07, which enumerates the
basic powers of notaries, provides that:
[A] notary public may, within the county for which he is
appointed, or if commissioned for the whole state, through-
out the state ... take and certify depositions. ...
In addition, Section 2319.10, which is part of the Code Chapter 4
on depositions, specifically provides that:
[D]epositions may be taken in this state before a ... notary
public....
*Of the law firm of Rippner, Schwartz & Carlin of Cleveland; Lecturer at
Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Ohio Rev Code § 2319.01.
2 Id. § 2319.02.
3 Id. §§ 147.07 and 2319.10.
4 Id. Chapter 2319 entitled "Affidavits, Depositions."
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Procedural Requirements Incident to the Taking of Depositions
In brief, three things must be done before a deposition may
be taken: filing a lawsuit, notifying the adverse party, and sub-
poenaing the witness.
When a plaintiff has filed his action in court and made serv-
ice upon the defendant, each party may commence the taking of
testimony by deposition.5 The party taking the deposition, called
the "deponent," must give written notice to the adverse party of
his intention to take a deposition," but need not reveal the name
of the witness whose deposition is to be taken,7 unless the wit-
ness is the adverse party and the deponent desires to use the
deposition of such adverse party in his own behalf.8 The notice
must be served upon the adverse party, his agent, or attorney of
record, or left at the usual place of their abode, and the deposi-
tion can only be used against parties so served. 9
After or simultaneous to serving the adverse party with
notice of the taking of the deposition, the notary must issue a
subpoena directing the witness to attend the deposition and to
testify. 10 The subpoena may also direct the witness to bring with
him "any book, writing, or other thing under his control, which
he may be compelled to produce as evidence." 11
The Taking of the Deposition
The proceedings are similar to the examination of a witness
during the trial of a lawsuit. First, the witness to be deposed is
duly sworn to tell the truth.1 2 The deponent conducts a direct
examination of those witnesses he has called; 13 however, if the
5 Id. § 2319.06.
6 Id. § 2319.15. This section provides that the notice must set forth the
court or tribunal where the deposition is to be used, and the time when
and the place where the deposition is to be taken.
7 Appel v. Appel, 78 Ohio App. 53, 65 N. E. 2d 153 (1946).
s Ohio Rev. Code § 2319.15; Appel v. Appel, supra, note 7.
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 2319.16; service on the adverse party can also be made
by serving his agent or attorney of record. If the adverse party cannot be
personally served within the state, he may be served by publication under
§ 2319.17.
10 Id. § 2317.12; the subpoena must set forth the time when and the place
where the deposition is to be held.
11 Id. § 2317.13.
12 Id. § 2319.24; House v. Elliott, 6 Ohio St. 497 (1856).
13 In re Rauh, 65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N. E. 701 (1901); Donovan v. Decker, 61
Ohio Law Abs. 67, 105 N. E. 2d 664 (1951), reh. den. 106 N. E. 2d 167 (1951);




witness is an adverse party, he may be cross-examined.14 Of
course, the adverse party will have an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness at the conclusion of deponent's examination.
Finally, the entire proceeding before the notary must be
transcribed by a stenographer and signed by the witness.15
The Use of the Deposition
After the deposition is reduced to writing and signed by the
witness, there are certain statutory procedural requirements
and conditions which must be met before the deposition may be
admitted into evidence at trial.
There are two basic statutory procedural requirements.
First, the notary must affix his certificate and signature to the
deposition, under his official seal.1 6 This certificate must state
that: (1) the witness was sworn to tell the truth; (2) that the
deposition was reduced to writing by the notary or some other
proper person; (3) the deposition was written and signed in the
presence of the notary; and (4) the deposition was taken at the
time and place set forth in the notice. 17
Second, the deposition must be filed in the court where the
case is to be tried at least one day prior to trial."
The statutory conditions precedent to the use of the deposi-
tion at trial are, in substance, that a deposition of a witness may
only be used in trial where the witness "does not reside in, or is
absent from, the county where the action or proceeding is pend-
ing, or, by change of venue, is sent for trial," or when the wit-
ness is dead or is unable to attend court.1 9 Where the testimony
of the witness is required upon a motion, or where the oral ex-
amination of the witness is not required, the deposition may be
used.2
0
14 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.07.
15 Id. § 2319.18; this section provides in substance that the transcribing of
the deposition may be done by the notary, the witness or some disinterested
person.
16 Id. § 2319.23.
17 Id. § 2319.24.
18 Id. § 2319.26. However, under § 2319.27, the notary may retain custody of
the deposition until his statutory fees are paid.
19 Id. § 2319.05.
20 Id. § 2319.21; the deposition may be read at any stage of the action or
proceeding.
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In spite of the statutory requirements of one day prior filing
and the statutory conditions prescribed by Section 2319.05 such
depositions may be used, regardless of such requirement and
conditions, during cross-examination of a witness for the purpose
of impeaching his testimony.
21
The Power of the Notary to Punish for Contempt
in the Deposition
The power of the notary to punish witnesses for contempt is
set forth in two sections of the Ohio Revised Code.22 Section
147.07, which specifies the powers of the notary, provides in
part:
[the notary] in taking depositions, . . .shall have the power
which is by law vested in justices of the peace to compel the
attendance of witnesses and punish them for refusing to
testify.
In addition, Section 2317.20 of the Revised Code provides, in
part:
[D]isobedience of a subpoena, a refusal to be sworn .. .and
an unlawful refusal to answer as a witness or to subscribe
a deposition, may be punished as a contempt of the . . . offi-
cer by whom the attendance or testimony of the witness is
required.
Section 2319.10 of the Revised Code, includes "notary" within
the purview of officers authorized to take depositions.
These statutory grants of authority present problems in two
ways. First, is a notary limited under Section 147.07 to the con-
tempt powers of justices of the peace-i.e. "to fine"-or are his
contempt powers extended to those of "other officers" under Sec-
tion 2317.20-"to arrest and imprison"? The supreme court re-
solved this apparent statutory conflict, holding that the prede-
cessor of Section 147.07 was not a limiting statute, and that it
must be read together with sections of the Code dealing with
21 McCullough Transfer Co. v. Pizzulo, 53 Ohio App. 470, 5 N. E. 2d 796
(1936). The court in this case stated: "It has become a very general practice
for attorneys to take the testimony of known adverse witnesses, using the
provisions of law providing for the taking of depositions as a sort of bill of
discovery, and likewise, for the purpose of enabling counsel to take ad-
vantage of any conflict in the statements of the witnesses, there being no
intention of counsel taking the depositions to make any other use thereof."
Id. at 474, 5 N. E. 2d at 798 (1936).




depositions. 23 Thus, the notary is not limited merely to the fin-
ing powers of a justice of the peace but can arrest and jail the
contemptuous witness.24
Second, it was argued that such legislative grants of power
to the notary were judicial in nature and therefore antagonistic
to the Ohio Constitution which vested all judicial power in the
courts of Ohio.25 The supreme court disposed of these constitu-
tional objections, holding that the power to punish for contempt
was not purely judicial in the "constitutional sense"; such power,
having been recognized as essential to the deposition, 26 could be
granted by statute to the notary. Thus, as subsequently stated,
the notary is not an officer of the court; he exercises his power
to punish for contempt independently of any court, and the
courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the notary from punishing
for contempt.
2 7
The notary can, therefore, punish as contempts the actions
of witnesses in disobeying a subpoena, refusing to be sworn, un-
lawfully refusing to answer questions, or refusing to subscribe
to a deposition.
28
While the notary's power to punish for contempt has been
recognized and accepted by the courts, a more peaceful solution
to the disputes giving rise to contempts is the development and
use of the non-statutory procedure of seeking instructions from
a court.2 9 Under this procedure, the notary public, with the con-
sent of the parties to the action, submits questions to the com-
mon pleas court for instructions as to how to proceed during the
course of the deposition, thus obviating the use of contempt pro-
ceedings.3 0
23 DeCamp v. Archibald, 50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893).
24 Ibid.
25 Article IV, Section I of the Ohio Constitution provides that "The judicial
power of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of
common pleas, courts of probate, and such other courts inferior to the courts
of appeals as may from time to time be established by law (Adopted Sep-
tember 3, 1912).
26 DeCamp v. Archibald, supra, note 23.
27 State ex rel. Bechtel v. McCabe, 60 Ohio App. 233, 20 N. E. 2d 381 (1938).
But, see Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 809 (Su-
perior Ct. 1886) which, in approving the practice of notaries to seek instruc-
tions from the courts, held that notaries were officers of the court.
28 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.20.
29 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation Co., 9 Dec. Rep. 809 (Super. Ct. 1896);
Thomas v. Beebe, 5 Ohio N. P. 32 (C. P. 1932).
30 Ibid.
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The use of such instructions, while perhaps a practical solu-
tion to the difficulties engendered by contempt proceedings,
would appear to conflict with the basic theories espoused in the
DeCamp case 31 that the notary is not an officer of the courts, but
acts independently. Further, although the instruction procedure
appears to be commonly used in some counties, it is not sup-
ported by any statutory authority.3"
The Procedural Steps
The notary maintains his authority through the use of the
writ of attachment for fines, and the order of commitment for
imprisonment. Thus, if a witness refuses to obey a subpoena is-
sued by a notary, the notary may issue a writ of attachment to
the sheriff commanding the sheriff to arrest and bring the wit-
ness before the notary to give his testimony and answer for the
contempt.3 3 Or he may direct an order of commitment to the
sheriff which shall order the sheriff to commit the contemptuous
witness to jail. 34 Both the attachment for arrest and order to
commit a witness to prison by the notary must be under the
notary's seal, and must set forth the cause of the arrest or com-
mitment. If the witness has refused to answer a question which
the notary has directed him to answer, the order for commitment
must state the question which the witness refused to answer.35
Once the contemptuous witness has been arrested or im-
prisoned, incident to an attachment or commitment, the notary,
to force the witness to comply with his orders, may either fine
the contemptuous witness 36 or imprison the witness in the
county jail until he submits to be sworn, testifies, or gives his
deposition.37
31 50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893).
32 The case of State ex rel Bechtel v. McCabe, 60 0. App. 233, 236, 20 N. E.
2d 381, 383 (1938) in discussing the lack of authority for use of instructions,
stated: "It is true our state courts are vested with considerable discretion
in matters of procedure not regulated by statute, but where the statute
clearly defines the procedure, as it does here, and no alternative procedure
is indicated, the statutes must control . . .".
33 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.21. This section also sets forth several exceptions
if the witness has not been personally served or if the witness is not re-
quired to be immediately brought before the notary.
34 Id. § 2317.26.
35 Id. § 2317.25.
36 Id. § 2317.22 sets forth in detail the maximum fines to be imposed upon
the witness.




The rights of the witness are protected in two ways. The
imprisoned witness may apply to a judge of the supreme court,
court of appeals, court of common pleas, or probate court to dis-
charge him on the ground that he has been illegally imprisoned. 3
In addition, the witness may seek his release by way of habeas
corpus.39
The Substance of the Contempt
Thus far this article has dealt primarily with the statutory
rules and regulations controlling the taking of the deposition
and the statutory requirements governing contempt proceedings.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the practical application
of these statutory rules to five of the most common types of
contempts.
The Refusal of the Witness to Appear
Failure of a witness to appear for deposition when properly
summoned by subpoena constitutes a contempt. 40 However, the
witness cannot be punished for contempt where he refused to
attend the deposition because the deponent had prohibited his
counsel from accompanying him into the deposition. 41 To re-
quire the attendance of the witness under such circumstances,
would be to deprive the witness of his constitutional rights.4 2
The Refusal of the Witness to be Sworn
Where a witness is properly summoned to a deposition and
appears, he shall be held in contempt if he refuses to be sworn.43
The notary's order of commitment is sufficient in such a case if
it shows that the witness unlawfully refused to be sworn.44 The
38 Id. § 2317.24.
39 DeCamp v. Archibald, supra, note 23; Ex Parte Jennings, 60 Ohio St. 319,
54 N. E. 262 (1899).
40 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.20.
41 Peters v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 76 N. E. 2d
412 (C. P. 1947).
42 Ibid. The ordinary witness has the right to refuse to answer questions
on the grounds of self-incrimination and privileged communications. With-
out counsel, the witness might waive these valuable rights through ig-
norance.
43 In re Sage, 24 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 7, 34 Ohio C. D. 441 (1915); Schott v.
Benckenstein, 6 Ohio App. 63 (1915), aff'd. 92 Ohio St. 29, 110 N. E. 633
(1915).
44 In re Sage, supra, note 43.
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statute applies to all witnesses including an adverse party.45 A
witness cannot refuse to be sworn on the ground that the con-
ditions for the use of the deposition in trial are not present,46 for
the right to take a deposition is not controlled by the right to use
it.4 ' However, a witness can lawfully refuse to be sworn where
he had previously given his complete testimony on deposition
and was willing to sign it upon the making of certain correc-
tions.48
Refusal of the Witness to Answer Questions
Witnesses have refused to answer questions on advice of
counsel, 49 on the ground of competency, relevancy, or material-
ity,50 and on the ground of privilege. 51 Whether the witness must
answer such questions often depends upon whether the witness
is an ordinary witness or an adverse party. Also, since the notary
is not a judge and therefore cannot rule on the propriety of the
evidence, 52 the competency or relevancy of the questions must be
determined upon trial or upon a habeas corpus proceeding.
In any case, it is mandatory that the witness be ordered by
the notary to answer the question propounded for the contempt
to be proper.53 The refusal of the witness to comply with the
notary's order constitutes an "unlawful refusal to answer" un-
der section 2317.20 which defines contempts. 54
Where the witness refused to answer questions purely upon
"advice of counsel," the witness was properly held in contempt,
for to hold otherwise would be to permit the counsel and wit-
45 In re Rauh, 65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N. E. 701 (1901).
46 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 809 (Super. Ct.
1886) provides in its first syllabus: "1. A witness is not excused from giving
his deposition under Secs. 5265 and 5266, Rev. Stat., on the ground that he is
not interested in the action; that he is within the county in which the action
is pending, and that he does not intend to depart; that he is in good health,
and will be able to attend court as a witness when the case is reached for
trial."
47 In re Rauh, supra, note 45.
48 In re Hafer, 65 Ohio St. 170, 61 N. E. 702 (1901).
49 In re Bott, 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N. E. 2d 918 (1946).
50 In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388 (1943).
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388 (1943); DeCamp v.
Archibald, 50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893); Burnside v. Dewstoe, 9
Ohio Dec. Rep. 589 (C. P. 1886).




ness to act as judges in determining the propriety of the ques-
tions.55
In the oft-cited case of DeCamp v. Archibald56 the witness
was committed to jail for refusing to answer certain questions on
the grounds that they were incompetent and irrelevant. In a
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, the court held that such
a refusal was contemptuous and that the witness must answer
the questions; whether such questions were competent or rele-
vant to the case would be determined by the judge upon trial
of the action. The court, however, complicated its decision by
stating that the questions were, in fact, competent and relevant.5 7
This latter statement was subsequently relied upon by the su-
preme court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, 5  to justify an exam-
ination into the merits of a case to determine the competency
and relevancy of questions asked upon a deposition.
50
In re Schoef 60 appeared to hold that a witness could not be
jailed for contempt by a notary where he objected to answering
the questions propounded upon the grounds of competency, rele-
vancy, and materiality, but the supreme court in its landmark
decision of In re Martin, Jr.61 held that these two cases were
grounded upon privilege questions. Martin specifically over-
ruled the fourth syllabus of the Schoef case which had held that
a witness could not be lawfully ordered to answer a question
where he objected on the grounds of competency, relevancy, or
materiality.
The Martin case, however, was limited in application to "a
witness who is not a party." 6 2 Thus, the supreme court in the
Martin case decided that a witness who is not a party, once he
55 In re Bott, 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N. E. 2d 918 (1946); Ex parte Oliver, 173
Ohio St. 125, 180 N. E. 2d 599 (1962).
56 50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893).
57 DeCamp v. Archibald, 50 Ohio St. 618, 35 N. E. 1056 (1893).
58 Ex Parte Jennings, 60 Ohio St. 319, 54 N. E. 262 (1899).
59 Ibid.
60 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N. E. 276 (1906).
61 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388 (1943).
62 The fourth syllabus of In re Martin, Jr., 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N. E. 2d 388
(1943) provides: "4. A witness who is not a party has no legal right, upon
the taking of his deposition, to refuse to answer any question, upon the ad-
vice of his attorney, merely because the attorney believes that the testimony
sought is irrelevant, incompetent or immaterial. (Paragraph four of the
syllabus in Ex parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N. E. 276, 6 L. R. A., N. S.,
325; and Ex parte Martin, Jr., 139 Ohio St. 609, 41 N. E. 2d 702, overruled.)"
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has been ordered to answer a question, cannot lawfully refuse
to answer on the grounds of competency, relevancy, or material-
ity. 3 The court further held that the determination of whether
the questions were in fact competent or relevant to the issues of
the action, could not be made in a habeas corpus proceeding, but
could only be determined by the judge upon the trial of the
case.
64
Therefore, the Martin case, while it put to rest many of the
questions regarding the rights of non-party witnesses, left open
the problem of witnesses who are parties to the action, leaving
them in a position to refuse to answer questions which they be-
lieve are not competent or pertinent to the issues, and placing
the determination of such questions on the court in a habeas
corpus proceeding. 5
However, though the party witness will receive relief upon
a habeas corpus proceeding, the non-party witness is caught in
a vicious cycle. If he refuses to answer a question, he will be
jailed for contempt. If he files for a release on habeas corpus,
how can the court release him if it hasn't the power to deter-
mine the competency, relevancy, or materiality of the question
propounded? Must the non-party witness rot in jail until the
trial of the lawsuit; or, must he answer the question at his peril?
A recent case requires the non-party witness to answer the
question. 65a
The one area in which the courts uniformly agree is that the
witness, whether a party or not, may lawfully refuse to answer
questions which they claim are incriminating or privileged,66
and that a court on a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding will
determine whether or not the questions do involve privilege.
6 7
The privilege, however, must be one created by constitution or
statute.68 As stated by the supreme court in In re Martin Jr.: 69
63 Id. at 100, 47 N. E. 2d at 394 (1943).
64 Id. at 101, 47 N. E. 2d at 394 (1943).
65 In re Berger, 13 Ohio App. 206 (1919); In re Grosswiller, 47 Ohio App.
409, 191 N. E. 910 (1943).
65a Ex parte Oliver, 173 Ohio St. 125, 180 N. E. 2d 599 (1962).
66 In re Martin, Jr., supra, note 62; DeCamp v. Archibald, supra, note 57.
67 In re Martin, Jr., supra, note 62.
68 In re Frye, 155 Ohio St. 345, 98 N. E. 2d 798 (1951); In re Martin, Jr.,
supra, note 62.




It is well settled in this state that a witness has the lawful
right to refuse to answer any question, the answer to which
would infringe any personal privilege granted by the Con-
stitution or statutes of Ohio, or any recognized rule of the
common law, and a witness committed for contempt for such
refusal has the right to have that question of privilege de-
termined in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding.
While the witness has the right to a determination of privi-
lege questions in a subsequent habeas corpus action, the burden
rests upon him, where he has grounded his refusal to answer
upon privileged communications, to prove both the existence of
a confidential relationship, and that the communications were
made incident to that relationship and did not deal with extrane-
ous matters.7 0
The courts in Ohio have given broader protection to the
witness in the area of self-incrimination and privileged commu-
nications due to the fact that such privileges are waived by a
failure to object on the part of the witness.71
In the case of In re Berger,72 the plaintiff called one of the
defendants in for deposition. The defendant refused to answer
any question "for the reason that the object of the deposition ...
[was] to discover defendants' testimony." In a later habeas
corpus proceeding, the defendant having been committed for
contempt, the court held that where the statute73 provided that
a party might, upon deposition, be examined as if under cross-
examination, the party could not refuse to testify on the ground
that the deposition was to discover his testimony. 74
Thus, the party witness cannot refuse to testify even where
the party taking the deposition has no intention of using the
same upon the trial of the action. 75 But, the questions asked
must be relevant, and where a deposing party stated that he
wished to examine the adverse party to help him develop his
case, 76 the court held that the legislative intent of the deposition
70 Id. at 103, 47 N. E. 2d at 395 (1943).
71 Peters v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 50 Ohio L. Abs. 65, 76 N. E. 2d 412
(C. P. 1947).
72 13 Ohio App. 206 (1919).
73 Ohio Gen. Code § 11497, now Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.07.
74 In re Berger, 13 Ohio App. 206 (1919).
75 In re Grosswiller, 47 Ohio App. 409, 191 N. E. 910 (1934).
76 In re Berger, supra, note 74.
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provisions was not that it would be used purely for discovery
purposes.7
7
Refusal to Produce Books and Documents
The notary public has the power to issue a subpoena duces
tecum for the witness to produce his books or records and to
punish for contempt a witness disobeying the writ.
78
If the defendant refuses to produce books and documents at
his deposition by the plaintiff, for no other reason than upon ad-
vice of counsel, he is in contempt.
79
By virtue of sections 11550 to 11555, both inclusive, General
Code (now sections 2317.31 to 2317.35, and section 2317.48
of the Revised Code), a party to an action is given broad
authority to inspect books, papers, and documents under the
control of the adverse party to produce them as evidence
either in court or before an officer authorized to take testi-
mony in the case; and section 11503, General Code (now
section 2317.13 of the Revised Code) provides that by sub-
poena issued to a witness, a notary public may require the
witness to testify and to bring with him any book or writing
or other thing under his control, which he may be compelled
to produce as evidence.
80
The refusal to produce the books on advice of counsel was not
sufficient, and the witness had no immunity from productions of
documents or records "if the testimony or production of docu-
ments does not involve self-incrimination or privileged commu-
nications and the objection is merely to the competency or rele-
vancy of the evidence sought." 81
Refusal to Sign the Deposition
The refusal of the witness, upon command of the notary, to
sign his deposition constitutes a contempt.8 2 However, the re-
fusal of the witness to sign his deposition until certain correc-
77 Thomas v. Beebe, 5 Ohio N. P. 32 (C. P. 1898).
78 In re Rauh, 65 Ohio St. 128, 61 N. E. 701 (1901); In re Bott, 146 Ohio St.
511, 66 N. E. 2d 918 (1946).
79 In re Bott, supra, note 78.
80 Id. at 515, 66 N. E. 2d at 920 (1946).
81 Id. at 517, 66 N. E. 2d at 921 (1946). See also Ex parte Oliver, spra, n.
65a.




tions were made in the transcript of the deposition, did not con-
stitute a contempt.s 3 The supreme court stated: 84
Nothing is more likely to occur than errors in taking
down the testimony of a witness, even when done by a
stenographer. The witness must be the judge as to whether
his testimony had been accurately taken down by whoever
it is done. What he signs is his sworn statement, and he
should not be required to sign what he under oath says is
not accurate. Perjury could not be assigned upon a deposi-
tion so taken....
Conclusion
It can be seen that while the deposition is a most important
tool for the attorney, in many cases there will be delays and
roadblocks.
The notary has vast power to punish witnesses for contempt
for refusing to appear in answer to a subpoena, for refusal to be
sworn, for refusal to answer questions, for refusal to produce
documents, and for refusal to subscribe his deposition. Where
the witness has been committed to jail by the notary, the ques-
tion of contempt will have to be determined in a later habeas
corpus or other proceeding under section 2317.24 of the Revised
Code, or it will have to wait until trial of the action.
Thus far, it appears that the only questions which the courts
will consider on a habeas corpus proceeding are questions in-
volving privileged communications or self-incrimination, except
where the witness is the adverse party and then it appears that
the court on habeas corpus will determine questions of com-
petency or relevancy of the evidence.
In all other situations of contempt, the witness will have to
either answer the order of the notary or remain in jail until the
trial of the issue where the judge can make his determination
whether the testimony is admissible into evidence.
Therefore, while the notary has the summary power to pun-
ish for contempt as a necessary incident to the compelling of
testimony, the procedure for determining the substance of the
contempt does not rest with him, but with a judge upon habeas
corpus or trial of the action.
83 In re Hafer, 65 Ohio St. 170, 61 N. E. 702 (1901).
84 Id. at 172, 61 N. E. at 703 (1901).
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